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Introduction 
The combination of economics and the cultural and creative industries is a 
complicated one.  The intangible nature of the cultural and creative industries 
does not lend itself to standard economic analysis of the utility and profit-
maximising emphasis of neoclassical economics.  Similar challenges occur in 
the economics of happiness, health, the environment and other areas marked 
by their intangible nature. Despite this awkward matching, the economic 
analysis of the cultural and creative industries, and the role of creativity, is a 
vibrant and growing area.   
This chapter examines themes in what is known as cultural economics, with a 
particular focus on innovation, creativity and intellectual property (IP).  It 
details emerging trends in economic analysis of the cultural and creative 
industries and highlights challenges that mainstream, neoclassical economic 
analysis faces when confronting characteristics of the creative industries.  
Terminology 
A great deal of energy in academic studies of the creative industries (CI), and 
related termsi, is spent on their definition.  These are important discussions as 
the classification of industries, primarily through Standard Industrial 
Classifications, reflects political and social constructs of industry.  While these 
nuances are important to wider debates, for the purposes of the chapter, this 
chapter focuses on four key terms: the creative industries, creativity, 
innovation, cultural economics, cultural policy and largely adopts the 
terminology as detailed in (Towse 2014) and (Towse 2010).   
Creative industries indicates the UK government’s Department for Media, 
Culture and Sport1998ii definition consisting of advertising, antiques, 
architecture, crafts, design, fashion, film, leisure software, music, performing 
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arts, publishing, software, and TV and radio (antiques has since been 
removed, DCMS (2015).  
Creativity, discussed in Towse (2010), refers to the ‘artistic creativity’ defined 
by UNCTAD (Economy 2008) as, “artistic creativity involves imagination and a 
capacity to generate original ideas and novel ways of interpreting the world, 
expressed in text, sound and image.”iii This chapter focuses on creativity as 
related to the creative industries. (Towse 2010) notes, “Creativity has thus 
come to be seen as the contemporary equivalent of innovation in the industrial 
age.”iv This chapter adopts a Shumpeterian approach to innovation as a wider 
concept than creativity.  Schumpeter (1942) approaches innovation as ‘creative 
destruction’ in a, “process of industrial mutation–if I may use that biological 
term–that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” 
Schumpeter further describes examples of innovation as the launch of new 
products, opening of new markets, application of new methods, acquiring of 
new supply sources and new industry structures. In the singular as opposed 
to the general process, an innovation is typically described in economics as 
an applied invention.  The emphasis, like with creativity, is on the idea of ‘new.’ 
Finally, this chapter will use cultural economics as the branch of economics 
concerned with the application of economic principles to the study of the 
cultural and creative industries.  This is in line with the Towse (2010) definition, 
but excludes the cultural economics sub-disciplines as defined by the Journal 
of Economic Literature (JEL) codes of the economics of religion, economic 
ideologies and social economy. Likewise, the use of the term cultural policy is 
broadly in line with Towse (2010, 2014) definition of cultural policy to include 
policies related to the creative industries, including funding, taxation, 
measurement, regulations, and, to explicitly reflect recent trends in 
scholarship, IP.  
This approach is not without its critics as Garnham (2005) notes. He adopts 
“arts and media policy” instead of “cultural policy,” as the later is not neutral.  
Indeed, “arts and media policy” may be a better descriptor of the economic 
definition, but one that has not been adopted by the literature. Hesmondhalgh 
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(2005) also argues for including media policy as part of policy; tensions 
between these policy definitions are detailed in Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 
(2005.)  In short, an economic approach to cultural policy examines 
government policy related to the cultural and creative industries.  
To summarise, this chapter focuses on the creative industries as part of 
cultural policy, the economic study of the creative industries, and relates these 
analysis to innovation and creativity. 
Cultural Economics: Evolution and Critiques 
“Whenever economists study areas outside their traditional field, the 
economy, they run the danger of misperceiving what contribution they 
are able to make. Only if the choice of which aspects to study is carried 
out carefully can a useful and novel contribution on the part of 
economics be expected.” 
         (Frey 1994) 
Cultural economics as a discipline, in its current formv, gained currency in the 
1960s with the works of William Baumol and William Bowen and their analysis 
of cost structure in the arts (Throsby 1994).  Despite the half century that has 
passed since Baulmol, many economists still argue that economics continues 
to neglect, or fails to adapt to, the creative industries. Arguments of this sort 
can be found in Howkins (2002),  Throsby and Throsby (2001) argue the outputs 
and structures of the creative industries do not fit into the neoclassical 
economic classification of goods and services, Caves (2000) argues economics 
has largely neglected the creative industries, and, finally, Stoneman (2010), 
who argues economics has largely excluded included creativity and ‘soft’ 
innovation in studies of innovation, amongst others.   
The category of “Cultural Economics” was introduced under the 
“Miscellaneous” classification of JEL codes in 1991, following a move 
amongst economists to, “claim an independent category for their field.”vi 
(Cherrier 2014) JEL codes reflect mainstream economic disciplines and are in 
keeping with their North American origins.  The structure of JEL, as do SIC, 
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deliminates intradisciplinary boundaries.  The bulk of what would be 
considered cultural policy or creative industries by the literature discussed in 
this chapter, falls under the JEL Z11, “Economics of the Arts and Literature” 
which is described as, “studies about economic issues related to the arts and 
literature, including demand, supply and pricing analysis.” (AEA 2016) and 
Z18 “Cultural Economics; Public Policy,” described as, “studies concerning 
public policy on art, religion and other matters in Z1 [the top level classification 
for Cultural Economics].”  This, however, is an awkward fit for some of 
definitions of cultural policy and creative industries discussed earlier, which 
are perhaps better encompassed when including codes from other areas, 
such as L82 “Industry Studies: Services: Entertainment; Media (Performing 
Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.),” 03 “Innovation; Research 
and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights” and 
other codes addressing trade, international agreements, production and 
industrial organisation.  
Written soon after the 1991 inclusion of cultural economics in JEL codes, 
Throsby (1994), describes, in JEL, the cultural industries to mean, “the arts, 
motion pictures, radio and television, and printing and publishing,” which, very 
loosely, could be interpreted to include publicly funded arts organisations.  He 
identifies the key focuses of cultural economics at the time as markets and 
public funding for art.  
Since the formal recognition of cultural economics, there remains significant 
scope for the expansion of cultural economics.  (Blaug 2001) and (Caves 2000) 
suggest that the areas of publishing and contracts, respectively, are under-
addressed. Both areas are now garnering further attention as in Ghose et al 
(2006) and Baker and Evans (2013). More recent arguments, (Throsby 2012), 
(Müller et al. 2009) and (Towse, 2010 and 2014) suggest that cultural 
economics is coming into its own.  
In the last decades of cultural economics, key themes of economic analysis 
have emerged. Rushton (2012) suggest that the starting premise of cultural 
economics is that the creative industries are a case of market failure. Frey 
(1994) suggests that analytical approaches progress in two main categories: 
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the first  being the relationship between sectors of spheres of society, and the 
second type being the rational choice approach to characterise the economic 
approach. He notes that cultural economic analysis typically combines the two 
approaches and uses the rational choice approach to analyse the effect of 
economic factors on the arts.   (1994) suggests that analytical approaches 
progress in two main categories: the first  being the relationship between 
sectors of spheres of society, and the second type being the rational choice 
approach to characterise the economic approach. He notes that cultural 
economic analysis typically combines the two approaches and uses the 
rational choice approach to analyse the effect of economic factors on the arts.   
(1994) suggests that analytical approaches progress in two main categories: the first  
being the relationship between sectors of spheres of society, and the second type 
being the rational choice approach to characterise the economic approach. He notes 
that cultural economic analysis typically combines the two approaches and uses the 
rational choice approach to analyse the effect of economic factors on the arts.   
The application of these approaches is often concerned with cultural policy, 
industrial organisation, welfare economics, economic geography, economic 
growth and development, amongst others.  In 1994, Throsby details the 
development of cultural economics from the 1960s and its adoption of 
neoclassical interpretations of taste, markets, demand, supply and labour 
markets to inform public policy. He predicted cultural economics would 
develop empirical insights to solve ‘nontrivial theoretical and empirical 
problems’ both in cultural policy and in economic methodologies in general, 
which, more than two decades later, continues to be thwarted by poor data. 
Towse (2010) describes a brief history of cultural economics as starting with 
subsidies for the arts, then moving through art markets, the development of 
theoretical models, the economics of museums, the introduction of the 
concept of the creative industries in the late 1900s, contractual and labour 
approaches, and a more recent focus on IP.  
 
IP has recently become a more dominant theme in cultural economics, and 
economics in general, as interest in innovation and creativity lends itself to 
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analysis of IP.  In the 1990s, economists largely used IP to define the creative 
industries.  As noted by Throsby (2001), IP as an industry’s output was so 
central to meeting the definition, to the point that the ‘copyright industries’ and 
‘cultural industries’ were virtually synonymous. In 1996, the Journal of Cultural 
Economics devoted an edition to IP. Since then, cultural economics is turning 
its attention further to IP. Of four key books published by cultural economists 
in 2000 and 2001, Caves (2000), Frey (2000), Throsby (2011) and Howkins 
(2001), Frey and Throsby have only cursory mentions of IP, Caves offers one 
chapter, of twenty two, and Howkins’s text is devoted to the topic.  As Towse 
(2006) notes, there is a wealth of areas to be explored in the application of 
cultural economics to IP.  These themes are developed later in the chapter 
and highlight the insights that may be gleaned from combining economics, 
culture and IP.  
 
Audiences for Economic Analysis 
Several reviewers of the progress of cultural economics over the years 
have observed that many writers have begun their books or papers 
with an apology for presuming that economics might have anything 
useful to say about art. THROSBY 1994	
The demand for economic analysis of cultural policy varies. In the Baulmol 
days of the 1960s, arts funding changes provided a ready audience. However, 
the interaction between economics and cultural policy has not enjoyed a 
smooth ride.  Peacock, (2004), reflecting on three decades as an economist in 
arts and arts policy, details the challenges of economic analysisvii in creative 
industries and their use in policy.  He notes the reluctance of vested interests, 
and special pleading by stakeholders, to admit that, “government support for 
the arts involves an opportunity cost.”viii   In particular, he argues that 
economics is widely accepted in policy for broadcasting, but that in 
preservation of works of art, buildings and the like, “there appears to be 
implacable opposition to the application of economic analysis designed to 
produce a rational system of pricing and investment which takes account of 
consumer interests.”ix He notes that institutions in publicly-funded parts of the 
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cultural industries (e.g. museums) view themselves as ‘guardians of public 
interest’ and consider themselves to know better, or be more likely to know, 
what is in the interests of future generation.  However, Hesmondhalgh (2005) 
suggests that economics enjoys a favoured position in UK politics starting in 
the late 1990s.  Instead, he argues economic analysis had a ready audience 
in being a malleable tool to legitimise political stances.  However, he repeats 
Peacock’s argument and notes that, “Cultural policy has usually been strongly 
associated with the subsidised arts sector, whereas media and 
communications policy has tended to be analysed in terms of economics and 
politics.” Whereas media and communications policy has traditionally been 
amenable to economic analysis, cultural policy has largely not.  This again 
speaks to an on-going debate on the economics of the creative industries as 
part of cultural policy analysis.   
 
Similar developments are to be found in the growing interaction between 
management and media studies.  As with economics, the literature 
addressing the interaction of cultural and management perspectives has 
noted the general reluctance of traditional media studies to the use of market 
or industrial terminology (McDonald, 2013).  Media studies are also expanding 
into interdisciplinary work under term “media industries studies” Schatz (2014). 
Pick et al (2015) also note a tension between creative industries and 
management studies, and suggest that ‘creative industries management’ is 
both an oxymoron and an opportunity.   This points to a general frustration 
over on-going tensions between media economics and political economy 
approaches to the study of media industries and cultural products Wasko and 
Meehn (2013).  
 
A concerted attempt to persuade reluctant audiences of the importance and 
potential of economic analysis can be found in Bahkshi et al (2007).  The 
authors seek to persuade stakeholders in cultural policy that economics can, 
and should, bolster the case for the arts. The authors, along with O’Brien 
(2010), provide critiques of economic methodologies and note the 
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measurement challenges the intangible nature of culture creates.  Bahkshi et 
al make their case on the basis that the special pleading of the arts/cultural 
policy implies that, “arts funding choices should be made independent of their 
effects on society.”  Economics, instead, offers a means to avoid this ‘arts 
exemption’ and strengthen the case for the arts.  
Tensions with Neoclassical Economics 
The reluctance of policy audiences for cultural economics speaks to a wider 
critique of neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics has long been 
criticised; this criticism experienced a sharp uptick in the 1990s as detailed in 
Thomspon (1997).  Noted critic McCloskey (McCloskey, 1998) condemns ‘the 
rhetoric of economics’ and the utility maximising approaches influenced by 
Ayn Rand’s objectivism.  McCloskey’s critiques are directed at the discipline 
as a whole, and cultural economics and neoclassical economics are not 
mutually exclusive. The McCloskey school of thought, when combined with 
the policy scepticism noted by Peacock, mean that cultural economics is 
prone to external and internal criticism.  Rational choice theory is a particular 
target of condemnation and, as noted by Throsby (2001), leads to the 
expectation that all behaviours can be fully accounted for in economic models, 
without regard to social, cultural or historical factors. O’Brien (2014), using the 
tensions between the humanities and economics as an analytical framework, 
largely confirms this view and details oppositions to economic constructs of 
individual rationality in UK cultural policy. Throsby (2001, 2012) also notes this 
tension, which he suggests stems from economics’ emphasis on the individual 
in contrast to the, by definition, collective emphasis of culture. He also notes 
(1994) that neoclassical views of tastes (the utility function) accommodate 
taste for the arts, but that this may fail to account for the irrationality of 
demand for art.  However, he also notes that, “the aggregate behaviour of 
consumers and of artists can be modelled in ways that are mostly consistent 
with economic theory.” To summarise, scepticism and criticism of the 
neoclassical economic approach abounds, and is particularly sharp in the 
creative industries and in cultural policy as a whole. 
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IP, Innovation and Creativity 
Creativity and Innovation 
While cultural policy has struggled to hold the attention of its intended 
audience, analysis of innovation has an eager audience.  In developed 
economies, politicians, policy makers and economists have a collective 
obsession with innovation in the hopes that it contributes to economic growth. 
These obsessions, and the associated economics of innovation, benefit from 
neoclassical, mainstream economic roots. While critics of the approach exists 
(e.g. feminist critiques as detailed later), the innovation-development-growth 
narrative is firmly entrenched in the political economy.  A long-term trend of 
developed economies moving away from manufacturing based to service 
based economies, has led to a greater emphasis on knowledge and the 
emergence of the “knowledge economy” as discussed in Garnham (2005). 
The focus on this new knowledge-based paradigm has promoted further 
analysis of innovation, which has led innovation-focused economists to look at 
creativity. For example, Lee and Rodriquez-Pose (2014) who examine the 
‘innovativeness’ of the creative industries and creative occupations; and The 
Work Foundation and NESTA’s 2007 report that argues, “creativity and 
innovation are overlapping concepts. In the main, creativity … is about the 
origination of new ideas … while innovation is about the successful 
exploitation of new ideas.” Similarly, Doyle (2016) notes a growing emphasis 
on innovation in the creative economy and media studies. This innovation 
approach follows a path dependency from the neoclassical understanding of 
innovation, particularly from an industrial organisation or economic 
development foundation.  As cultural economics also begins to look further at 
innovation and creativity arguments, with a focus on the creative industries, 
analysis from both neoclassical and cultural perspectives are meeting.  This 
section discusses these perspectives, and their reflection in IP debates. 
Economists link innovation to the creative industries, often done with the 
intent of proving the economic value of the creative industries, and implicitly 
discuss creativity.  For example, Bakhshi and McVittie (2009) detail how the 
creative industries enable other industries to be more innovative. Muller et al 
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(2009) notes three innovation impacts from the creative industries: creative 
industries contribute to the innovative potential of an economy, they may 
create inputs for innovation elsewhere in the economy and may serve a pull 
function as consumers of innovation.  Howkins (2001) argues that creativity is 
not an economic activity but can become so when transformed into an ‘idea 
with economic implications or a tradable product.”  This goes part way to 
fitting the classic definition of an innovation as an applied invention.  
Concepts of creativity, as detailed in (Towse, 2006) became more popular 
within cultural economics with Frey (1997).  Howkins (2001) devotes his entire 
book to the role of creativity and the concept of the creative economy. 
Previously, economics flirted with the concept of creativity by combining 
psychological research on creativity with economics.  This approach often 
took the form of examination of creativity in the marketplace in the form of 
entrepreneurship and management (e.g. works in the Journal of Creative 
Behaviour such as the 1988 Volume 22 Number 3 special edition including 
Fernald (1988) “The Underlying Relationship Between Creativity, Innovation 
and Entrepreneurship,” or the Creativity and Innovation Management journal 
for example Jeffcut and Pratt (2003) “Managing Creativity in the Cultural 
Industries”), or in the analysis of human capital (e.g. Rubenson and Runco, 
1992 whose theories were taken up more by psychologists than economists). 
Recent years have seen, as discussed earlier, creativity to be associated 
more with innovation and the creative industries. 
However, Garnham (2005) argues that the addition of creativity, rather than a 
critique or extension of the economics of innovation, is instead an attempt by 
cultural policy to capture the prestige of innovation.  Like Hesmondhalgh and 
Pratt (2005), Garnham notes the cultural policy tensions between creators 
(the purveyors of creativity) in creative occupations, and rightsholders 
(typically large corporations) arising from innovation/creativity approaches to 
creative industries introduces. These tensions can be seen in intellectual 
property policy, as discussed in the next section.  
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This relationship between creativity and innovation is an evolving one, and 
highlights the challenges faced by cultural economics.  The economics of 
innovation, particularly as related to economic growth and development, are 
well established and reflect a distinctly science focus.  This focus on science, 
and the narrow definition of innovation, is sometimes construed as a bias and 
challenged by proponents of the creative or knowledge economy (e.g. 
Rushton 2003, and feminist critiques of innovation and measurements of 
economic growth.)   
Intellectual Property 
The interaction between creativity, the creative industries and innovation has 
become more obvious in recent years with the rise of interest in IP policy. 
Major changes in the legal structure of IP have been marked by a step 
change introduced by the World Trade Organisation’s 1995 Trade-Related 
Aspects of IP (TRIPS) agreement, which harmonised and strengthened IP 
across the world.  This, along with changes in markets and technology, 
dominated by the advent of the Internet and the digital era, have challenged 
existing IP structures, in particular that of right most relevant to the creative 
industries, copyright. The relationship of the creative industries and copyright 
is so strong, that at various times, the term ‘the copyright industries’ has 
served as a synonym for creative industries. Towse (2006) made the case for 
copyright as falling within the realm of cultural economics. IP, which by 
definition only protects original contributions, also reflects the infinite variety 
(Caves 2000) and “extreme case of a heterogeneous commodity” Throsby 
(1994) by which each unit of the creative industries output is unique. As a 
result, IP policy has become a string in the cultural economist’s bow.  
The predominance of IP is not without its critics. Potts (2009) notes that the 
DCMS definition of the creative industries rests on a connection between 
creativity and IP that emphasises, “creativity as an input and IP as an output, 
a view that implicitly presumes that the value of the creative industries is 
ultimately in consumption of these creative outputs.”  Muller et al (2009) also 
note that IP is considered the main output of the creative industries, as 
opposed to goods and services. Potts is critical of this approach, as he argues 
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that the outputs of the creative industries play an important role in innovation 
as a whole, rather than being defined by the production and consumption of 
end outputs.  
Feminist interpretations of IP provide further critique of IP and neoclassical 
economics. Bawra and Rai (2002, 2004) argue IP denies the contribution of 
women to knowledge by taking a narrow approach to knowledge and 
assigning it to realms that have traditionally excluded women.  Halbert (2006) 
notes the lack of IP protection for the outputs of female knowledge. Halbert in 
particular relates this discussion to the creative industries by providing case 
studies on quilting and knitting, two creative practices dominated by women, 
as lying predominately outside the IP framework.  Santhosh and Sengupta 
(2011) argue IP undervalues the ‘gendered science’ of traditional knowledge. 
Collectively, the development of ‘creativity’ in the cultural economics sense, 
along with the feminist perspective, suggest that the definition of innovation, 
as protected by IP, is too narrow.  This plays into wider critiques of 
neoclassical economics’ core assumption of rationality and utility; however, as 
Bakhshi et al (2007) note, this critique is often directed at bad economics 
rather than a systematic failure of economic approaches. 
Economics’ love of innovation and subsequent focus on IP pre-dates the 
cultural economic analysis of IP.  As a result, discussions on creativity follow a 
path dependency into innovation and specific constructs of IP. The next 
section highlights this by detailing the evolution of the economic analysis of 
trade marks, in contrast to the analysis of the relatively newer rights of 
Traditional Knowledge (TK) and related rights.   
Creative Industries and IP 
Having established the relevance of IP policy to cultural economics, this 
section of the chapter uses examples of IP to further illustrate the challenges 
facing cultural economics as a critique of neoclassical economics. 
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Approaches to IP 
IP policy, and the laws which create it, generally exists to solve the problem of 
intangibility. The intangible nature of creativity and innovation means that 
ideas can easily be appropriated, and, in contrast to physical property, this 
appropriation is difficult to control.  This can undermine creators’ ability to 
recoup their investments, or profit, from their creations. For simplicity, I shall 
use the term ‘creator’ as being more inclusive to the creative industries than 
the more common ‘innovator’ used in general economics. IP policy seeks to 
create property rights over the intangible to bolster ownership and control of 
innovation and creativity. 
Justifications for why societies should have property rights over the intangible 
are dominated by twox main approaches. These are, IP rights as intrinsic 
rights, and IP as an incentive to innovate. Granstrand (2000) refers to these, 
respectively, as deontological approaches based on the intrinsic, moral rights 
and arguments that fall outside the economic perspective; and consquentialist 
approaches founded in the economic implications (e.g. incentive to innovate) 
of the legal structure of IP. These two approaches are often incompatible, with 
the incentive-to-innovate theory gaining traction in recent decades. 
Approaching IP rights as intrinsic rights comes from a Lockean perspective in 
which individuals own the fruit of their own labour (Hettinger 1989, 
Grandstrand 2000). Using this framework, the creativity and innovation 
stemming from an individual’s application of their labour should be owned by 
said individual. IP rights allow individuals rights over their outputs.  This 
approach is also known as labour-dessert theory and is an approach popular 
with lawyers and existing owners of IP rights.  The focus rests on the benefits 
to the individual creator.  
In contrast, the traditional economic approach to IP is to construe it as an 
incentive to innovate (Scotchmer 2004, Lemley 2005). In this model, often 
referred to as the social contract theory, the creator is rewarded with property 
rights in the form of IP.  These rights allow the creator to appropriate the 
returns to their efforts, and serve as an incentive to innovate. While society 
may incur higher costs and lower quantities because of the monopoly 
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conditions generated by IP rights, society is rewarded with long-term 
innovation.   This approach, crucially, also requires the expiration of IP rights 
so that, on expiration, the knowledge contained falls into the public domain 
where it will spur further innovation. The incentive-to-innovate theory is 
focused ultimately on economic growth and the benefits to society, and 
assumes innovation leads to economic growth and development.  
The incentives-to-innovate theory of IP has served economics well in 
analysing the IP rights of patents and copyright. Economics is largely 
comfortable with viewing patents and copyright as economic policies. The 
same cannot be said, however, for trade marks, traditional knowledge (TK), 
and Geographical Indications (GI); all three of which are relevant intellectual 
assets for the creative industries. These rights are heavily linked to the 
creative industries by way of branding, arts, textiles, design and advertising. 
Economics tends to be wholly uncomfortable with these rights as serving 
economic purposes as they do not fit the social contract. This tension 
between the neoclassical, incentive-to-innovate theory, and these 
noncompliant rights highlights the challenges cultural economics continues to 
face. 
Incompatible IP: The cases of Trade marks, TK and GI 
Patents have dominated economists’ analysis of IP, which is likely due to the 
relative wealth of data in this area and patents as fitting the science bias of 
constructs of innovation.  Recent decades have seen an expansion of 
economic analysis to copyright, trade marks and design rights.  In the case of 
the former, because of the dramatic changes in technology and its market 
consequences, and in the case of the two latter, likely due to the trend in 
national IP offices publishing data in these areas.  However, trade marks, 
along with TK and GI, do not easily fit the social contract theory and remain 
an awkward fit as an economic policy. 
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Trade marks 
Trade marksxi are an important intellectual asset for most firms, and in 
particular, as a means of protecting the creative outputs of the advertising and 
graphic design sectors.  However, trade marks lack two key characteristics of 
the social contract theory: they do not expire as long as renewal fees are paid, 
and they do not necessarily qualify as innovation. Assuming the owner of a 
trade mark pays their renewal fees, a trade mark can potentially last forever.  
Trade marks are traditionally not considered a form of innovation, a topic 
discussed in further below.  
Two foundational papers on the economics of trade marks are those of 
Landes and Posner (1987), and Economides (1998).  Both of these papers 
argue that trade marks exist primarily to promote economic efficiency, rather 
than innovation.  Landes and Posner further posit that trade marks serve to 
incentivise linguistic innovation. Economides (1988), however, is critical of the 
role of trade marks in distorting competition and market equilibria.   The bulk 
of subsequent analysis has taken a neoclassical approach and the economic 
scholars here do not self-identify as cultural economists. 
A standard economic interpretation of trade marks is their role in promoting 
efficiency by reducing information gathering costs via signalling to consumers.  
A trade mark is an exclusive mark that signals a brand’s reputation (or lack 
thereof).  This reputation will consist of a variety of factors influencing 
consumer decision-making.  The mark is an efficient way of signalling quality, 
an important factor, to the consumer.   This signal reduces search costs as, at 
a glance, the consumer will have information about the quality about a good, 
such as taste, provenance, etc.  Thus, marks reduce the information 
asymmetries between consumers and producers and promote efficiency.  
Initially, economic analysis suggested that branding was useful for a brand 
owner to increase their market share, but at the expense of another’s 
(discussed in Putsis, 1998).  Using this approach, the branding protected by 
trade marks operates in a zero sum game.  Following this line of thought, 
trade marks do not promote innovation because they operate in a zero-sum 
game.  Lemley (2004) is particularly scathing on justification of trademarks: 
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“Unlike patents and copyrights, trademark law and the right of publicity 
do not exist to encourage the creation of new brand names, personal 
names, or likenesses. There is no affirmative social interest in 
encouraging their proliferation, and, in any event, the fixed costs 
invested in creating a new name are so minimal that it is hard to 
imagine that creating one would require incentive.” 
However, starting in the mid-90s (Putsis 1998) economists explored the 
relationship between branding, promotions (temporary discounts or details) 
and sales of a particular category of goods, particularly in Fast Moving 
Consumer Goods (FMCG). This research, and further discussions (Corrado 
and Hao, 2013) suggests that the branding incentivised by trade marks can 
result in innovation.  Additionally, there are discussions on trade marks and 
branding as a good indicator of innovative activitiesxii and branding as 
facilitating the introductions of innovations to markets.  Greenhalgh and 
Rogers (2007), adopting a Shumpterian approach to innovation, examine the 
relationship between trade mark and innovation activities in firms and find that, 
“applications for trade marks are suggestive of product innovation.” Thus, if 
trade marks can promote or embody innovation, there is room for them to fit in 
an incentive-to-innovate interpretation of IP. 
Other economic analysis of trade marks extend to their role in facilitating 
firm’s appropriation of the returns to their investments in reputation. The leads 
to the conclusion that brands are often a firm’s most valuable asset 
(discussed and critiqued Klein (2010)). Other analysis examines the role of 
trade marks in conspicuous consumption, ala Veblen.  The use of trade marks, 
and trade mark policy, has also been examined in competition discussions 
and policy-specific analysis such as the optimal structure of trade mark 
registration processes and registries (e.g. Von Graevenitz, 2013.)  A rare 
explicitly cultural economic analysis by Cuccia et al (2008) looks at the role of 
collective trade marks in the San Gregorio Armenio district of Naples.  Known 
for its hand carved nativity scenes, the authors examine, from a creative 
cluster and regional government perspective, the potential use of trade marks 
to, “promote market incentives sustaining local development and preserving 
or enhancing the common knowledge.” The authors conclude a collective 
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trade marks would increase prices of the nativity scenes by 10%. Generally, 
economics finds trade marks to be an important intangible asset for firms and 
collectives.  
Trade marks illustrate the evolution of the economic analysis of IP.  Whereas 
early focus of analysis focused on the signalling and efficiency aspects of 
trade marks, more recent analysis has incorporate creativity and innovation 
aspects of branding. These contemporary arguments are not incompatible 
with neoclassical economics and suggest that development of cultural 
economics does not necessarily require departure from the mainstream, 
neoclassical perspective that is so often the subject of critique.  The same 
cannot be said of the current state of economic analysis of TK and GI.  
Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Geographical Indications (GI) 
Both TK and GI are relatively new types of IP as they have only existed in law 
and policy in the last century. Zappalaglio (2013) describes the origins of TK 
in international policy debates as starting in 1948. Monten (2005) notes that 
GI was largely unrecognised until the mid 1990s in TRIPs.  TK, however, 
exists legally in predominately non-binding agreements whereas GI is 
enshrined in law in many jurisdictions (e.g. the EU.) The relative youth of 
these types of IP goes in part to explain their absence from cultural 
economics.  However, in both cases, these IP are based on cultural and 
creative goods and services.  
Yudice (2009) notes tensions between IP regimes and anthropological 
approaches to culture.  He argues that uses of culture cluster around two 
main poles: anthropological approaches that focus on values and symbolic 
uses, and a creative element that focuses on innovation.  IP falls under the 
latter, and leads to discordant cultural policies where IP impinges on cultural 
policies, such as those promoting access to cultural goods. Akin to his 
anthropological descriptor, Doyle (2016) explains policy interventions in 
indigenous content media production as acting on “socio-cultural grounds.” 
Garnham (2005) argues that the creative approach and its policies, under the 
knowledge economy focus, is now inseparable from Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) policy.  However, ICT, which is a relative 
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new phenomena, clearly does not interact with the bulk of issues regarding 
TK, which is long-established.  The tension between these anthropological 
and creative approaches can be seen in TK and GI policy.  
Traditional Knowledge (TK) 
TK, which covers all manners of intangible assets of a community, speaks to 
the collective emphasis of culture. At present, economic analysis, with its 
individual, innovation focus, is at odds the collective, traditional focus on TK.  
The World IP Organisation defines TK as,  
Knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that are developed, 
sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a 
community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity. … TK 
in a general sense embraces the content of knowledge itself as well as 
traditional cultural expressions, including distinctive signs and symbols 
associated with TK. TK in the narrow sense refers to knowledge as 
such, in particular the knowledge resulting from intellectual activity in a 
traditional context, and includes know-how, practices, skills, and 
innovations. WIPO (2015) 
A subset of TK is Traditional Cultural Expressions (TCE), 
Also called "expressions of folklore", [TCE] may include music, dance, 
art, designs, names, signs and symbols, performances, ceremonies, 
architectural forms, handicrafts and narratives, or many other artistic or 
cultural expressions. … Their protection is related to the promotion of 
creativity, enhanced cultural diversity and the preservation of cultural 
heritage. (WIPO 2015)  
TK is a very awkward fit for a neoclassical, incentive-to-innovate analysis of IP. 
To start, the rights are poorly defined as TK itself lacks a clear definition.  
Further, TK are most often not expressed in any fixed way and their 
ownership is unclear, both of which make identifying the protected knowledge 
difficult. TK itself is unlikely to be traded in a monetary fashion and thus 
arguments in favour of recouping rewards to innovation are thin.  Additionally, 
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by definition, TK is traditional and any rights may actively discourage 
innovation.  However, the codification of the knowledge contained in TK may 
promote its diffusion and subsequent innovation; thus, TK may encourage 
further innovation. 
A common economic argument in favour of innovation is the economic growth 
and development of indigenous communities. These communities are often 
rural and economically poor. Protection of TK ‘owned’ by these communities 
could foster local development.   However, the development of a thriving 
market is dependent on many factors other than IP protection.  The 
introduction of an IP right merely provides the right to exclude others from 
using the IP. The capabilities to translate TK into economic success may 
require skills (absorptive capacity) not present in the community, and the 
community could license to a third party.  In this case, the TK may function as 
the equivalent of a natural resource with no long-term development impact. 
Dutfield (2005) is less pessimistic than this analysis, but notes that the 
development of goods and services incorporating TK exposes communities to 
the vagaries of the dominant economic system surrounding them. Yudice’s 
concept of the ‘anthropological’ approach to culture, by focusing on a social, 
value-driven side of culture, neither introduces nor addresses this economic 
doom, which the ‘creative’ approach does. 
In short, TK fails to fit the social contract, incentive-to-innovate economic 
interpretation of IP.   
Stronger arguments in favour of TK lie outside the domain of neoclassical 
economics, but in the social, cultural and historical context described by 
Throsby (2001). As noted in a WIPO fact-finding mission report, the value of 
TK is in the community’s cultural benefits. Discussions on IP frameworks in 
the Carribbean suggest that communities view their TK, “ as an economic 
asset and as cultural patrimony.... [and] did not separate “artistic” from “useful” 
aspects of their intellectual creations and innovations." WIPO (2008).   
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Economics is ill equipped to incorporate measurements of TK or cultural 
patrimony into its analysis.  Financial valuations are difficult in any form of 
intangible asset such as IP, but cultural patrimony is even more ethereal.  
One possible angle for inclusion would be to consider cultural patrimony part 
of the community’s utility function. This might capture some of the value and 
decision-making, but would be subject to the same market failures that form 
the basis of many approaches to cultural economics. This points to a 
contingent value methodology and choice modelling as potential solutions 
(O’Brien 2010).  It may also be that the costs of creating such empirical, 
quantitative measurements are disproportionate to the benefits. This 
combination of methodological challenges and practical costs suggest that 
theoretical or qualitative, rather than empirical or quantitative, analysis may be 
better deployed to inform TK policy.  
Current economic thinking does not allow for TK to fit into an innovation 
approach to IP.  The same could be said for trade marks, however recent 
analysis, adopting a wider definition of innovation, suggests trade marks can 
fit. The analysis of TK may follow a similar path.  As a cultural policy, TK 
suffers from this lack of positive economic interpretation, in addition to its 
already tenuous position in international policy debates. This suggests 
Yudice’s anthropological approach is at the core of justifications for TK, and 
attempts to fit TK into an overarching creativity and innovation approach are 
inappropriate.  This is not to say that economic analysis cannot inform cultural 
policy, but that a standard social contract/incentives-to-innovate approach is 
incomplete in its current form.  Revisiting the scope of economic analysis of 
the benefits of creativity and innovation to capture social values may introduce 
needed flexibility into social contract theory. This might benefit from beginning 
economic analysis of IP for a cultural economics perspective rather than an 
industrial organisation/growth perspective.  In short, adopting an 
intradisciplinary economic approach. Further analysis is required. 
Geographical Indications (GI) 
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GI, which overlap with TK, suffer from similar challenges in fitting social 
contract theory and innovation arguments.   Unlike other rights, they confer no 
freedom to contract or freedom to license.    Instead of incentivising innovation, 
GIs can actively discourage innovation.  A GI provides legal structure to the 
branding and quality of a product associated with a particular geographical 
region.  The neoclassical economic justification for GI is additionally 
undermined by the overlapping coverage of other rights (for example, 
collectively owned trade marks serve a similar purpose.)  
A geographical indication (GI) is a sign used on products that have a 
specific geographical origin and possess qualities or a reputation that 
are due to that origin. In order to function as a GI, a sign must identify a 
product as originating in a given place. In addition, the qualities, 
characteristics or reputation of the product should be essentially due to 
the place of origin. Since the qualities depend on the geographical 
place of production, there is a clear link between the product and its 
original place of production. WIPO, 2015 
Like trade marks, an economic argument for GI is to protect producers from 
free riding by competitors.  However, the long term economic benefits 
conferred on producers and these regions remains unproven. The introduction 
of a GI may benefit producers through legal protection, economic 
development and environmental concerns, but, like TK, these impacts are 
unclear.  Furthermore, the GI may distort incentives and affect both the quality 
and quantity of the product.  
The economic rhetoric focuses heavily on GI’s role in economic development 
of rural areas (Bramley 2011).  However, these arguments are weaker if 
individual producers are owned by larger businesses where profits may not 
develop the local economy.  Indeed, the production of wines and spirits has 
undergone significant consolidationxiii,xiv in past years and, in these markets, 
the majority of production of GI goods is owned by large multi-nationals.  This 
stands in contrast to the local, rural rationale for GI.  
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As with the impact on indigenous peoples with respective to TK, the long-term 
impact of GI on producers is uncertain. Existing producers may initially benefit 
from the price premium and reduced competition from products outside the GI 
protection, but cost inputs and distorted incentives may mean that the 
economic distribution of these benefits changes over time.   Thus, the original 
economic goals of the introduction of a GI may not be realised.  
GI have become more contentious as some countries seek to expand GI to 
non-agricultural products. These products are typically textiles such as pottery 
or woollens that still are strongly influenced by the environment in which they 
are produced. As a relatively new rightxv, non-agricultural GI are still 
developing and further refinement of the both the right, and the economic 
understanding, may occur. Yet to be fully considered by the literature is the 
appropriateness of government resources to protect rights not available to the 
general public. 
While neoclassical economic analysis of trade marks has evolved to 
incorporate a wider understanding of the economic contribution of branding, 
the same cannot be said for TK and GI.  However, cultural economics, with its 
well-developed understanding of cultural policy and creative industries, can 
contribute to this development and highlight the shortcomings of an incentive-
to-innovate, social contract approach to IP. 
Conclusions 
Cultural economics continues to evolve as analysis of the creative industries, 
intellectual property policy and economics, both in economic literature and 
policy development, merge.  As this chapter has detailed, discussions on 
innovation and creativity have led both innovation-focused and cultural 
economists to examine IP as a cultural and innovation policy.  However, 
analysis of IP highlights the restrictions that traditional economics face when 
examining the realm of cultural policy and creative industries. While long-
standing IP such as patents and copyright fit a neoclassical, incentive-to-
innovate approach and are satisfied with rational choice theory and the 
maximisation of profits and utility, emerging IP rights are not.  Economics’ 
focus on the individual falters when faced with the collective approach of 
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rights such as TK and GI.  However, the evolution of economic analysis of 
trade marks suggests that economic tools and analysis have the potential to 
adapt. 
Given the progression of IP as a topic of international negotiations, cultural 
economics’ interest in IP is likely to continue.  IP as a cultural policy merits 
further examination.  Areas to consider for future research are further 
examination of the impact on economic development stemming from IP such 
as TK and GI. Progression of the understanding of innovation, to include ‘soft’ 
innovation and creativity, will likely reformulate innovation policy. Copyright, 
only mentioned in passing in this chapter, is very poorly understood 
empirically and may benefit from the growth in data availability stemming from 
the digital era. Ultimately, these investigations may lead to a departure from, 
or further developments of, incentive-to-innovate approaches to IP. 
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i Including, but not limited to, the creative economy, the copyright industries, 
the creative industries, the cultural industries, cultural-political economy, and 
the creative classes. ii	The list of these industries, shown in “Creative Industries Mapping Documents 
1998”, is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/creative-
industries-mapping-documents-1998.	
iii ECONOMY, C. 2008. Report 2008: The Challenge of Assessing the Creative 
Economy: towards Informed Policymaking, UNDP-UNCTAD. p. 9 and repeated in 
the 2010 version of the report.  
iv TOWSE, R. 2010. A textbook of cultural economics, Cambridge University Press. P. 
105. 
v Thorstein Veblen’s seminal work, “Theory of Leisure Class” in 1898, could be 
classified as cultural economics. Works by Adam Smith (1700s) also consider the 
market for arts. 
vi (Cherrier, 2014) p. 35 
vii He also notes, unfortunately for your author, the challenges of a career as a cultural 
economist are many. He argues that foundations favour funding research building on 
well-established areas of economic analysis, one-off funding is rare, the opportunity 
costs of such careers are high, and the audience for economic research in the arts is 
limited.  
viii (Peacock, 2004), P. 177. 
ix Ibid, P. 175. 
x There is an emerging third nexus, which involves a near or total rejection of IP, 
which is not discussed here.  
xi Defined by WIPO (2015), as “A trademark is a distinctive sign which identifies 
certain goods or services as those produced or provided by a specific person or 
enterprise.” Available at http://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/trademarks.htrade marksl  
xii Further on the use of trade marks as a complementary measurement in industrial 
and innovation analysis can be found in Mendoca et al (2004)  
xiii Emler, R. (June 13, 2012), “Spirits Firms Poised for Further Consolidation,” The Drinks Business, 
Available at http://www.thedrinksbusiness.com/2012/06/spirits-firms-poised-for-further-consolidation/  
xiv Morss, E. (January 14, 2012), “The Future of the Global Wine Industry,” Morss Global Finance, 
available at http://www.morssglobalfinance.com/the-future-of-the-global-wine-industry/  
xv The first formalized system of GI is that of France which was put into law in the early 1900s. The 
European Commission began a consultation on NAGI in 2014.  
